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Abstract 
This article introduces and develops the concept of trade narrative to understand how business 
sectors defend against public disapproval and the threat of increased regulation or removed subsidy. 
Trade narrative works by accumulating lists of benefits and occluding costs, and is created by 
consultants for economic interests organised via trade associations. This represents an under-
analysed ‘policy-based evidence machine’, the aim of which is to format the discourses of the media 
and political classes about the contribution of the sector in ways that frame political choice about 
what is thinkable and doable. In doing so it supports elite power by providing a relay for intra-elite 
communication. Using illustrations from privatized railways, banking and pharmaceuticals in the UK 
and US, the argument explores how the causal arrow runs in the opposite direction from that 
supposed in most discussion of discourse-economy relations in the field of cultural economy.  
Key words: corporate business, economics, narrative, public policy, trade association, elite power, 
trade narrative  
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1. Introduction 
‘Political parties, however much they may be founded upon narrow class interests and however 
evidently they may work against the interests of the majority, love to …present themselves as co-
operating with all the citizens of the state, and to proclaim that they are fighting in the name of 
all for the good of all’ Robert Michels (1911: 16).  
The quotation from Michels is dated by his reference to mass, class based parties, but his claim still 
stands more than one hundred years later: in democracies with universal franchises, the public 
discourses of political justification work by invoking the general interest, identifying the public good 
and claiming social benefits which often cover private advantage of all kinds. Michels (1911: 16) 
called this the ‘philanthropic mask’ and this paper contributes to our understanding of how this 
process plays in present day capitalism in high income countries. Here the role and power of 
business has greatly increased but elites are less socially homogeneous; public interest justifications 
are still necessary but increasingly problematic where business enriches the few more reliably than it 
benefits the many (Piketty, 2014).  
This paper considers how business, organised through sectoral trade associations, now meets the 
demand for public interest justification by producing ‘trade narratives’ about the social contribution 
of business, especially in sectors like pharmaceuticals, finance and the privatised utilities which face 
disapproval from consumers and the media, or are threatened by unfavourable regulation and 
removal of public subsidy. Trade associations typically commission outside expertise in a consultancy 
firm to do the work of calculation; the resulting trade narrative classically takes the form of a list of 
social benefits -  big numbers on jobs created, exports generated and taxes paid - which are directly 
attributed to private firms operating under the existing regulatory and contractual regime. Within 
this narrative frame, it becomes easier to justify the maintenance of that regime and ideally to frame 
political choice about what is thinkable and doable as policy.   
This interesting phenomenon has been neglected because political science and cultural economy 
have had other preoccupations. Trade narrative is a public form of communication which works 
through reports, press releases and pamphlets; whereas political science has been more concerned 
with business influence through lobbying behind closed doors. In trade narrative, the causal arrow 
runs from the economy to discourse with expert knowledge as a docile calculator on an hourly rate, 
charged with serving the existing order. By way of contrast, in the performativity and 
governmentality literatures on the economy, the causal arrow runs in the opposite direction as the 
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discourses of experts format the economy and theory constitutes its object. This is so in Callon’s 
(1998) performative economics, Mackenzie’s (2008a) description of financial models as ‘an engine, 
not a camera’, and Miller’s (2001) concern with calculative practices and ‘visibility’.  
If we consider effects, trade narrative is part of an altogether messier world of business story telling 
amidst uncertainty. Trade narrative immediately creates a kind of halo effect around private 
business but the trade calculations are intellectually vulnerable because they exaggerate by ignoring 
costs and listing social benefits which are entirely attributed to the agency of private firms with all 
the complications glossed over. The political results are mixed. Many trade narratives work through 
an echo effect to frame debate as politicians and regulators repeat contestable but unchallenged 
trade claims about social benefits without recognising that this narrative is ‘economical with the 
actualité’ (Telegraph, 1999). Trade narrative may therefore be important for intra-elite 
communication and co-ordination but the political results are not robust because trade calculations 
of social benefits are almost certainly too technical to influence most of the electorate. 
The paper which develops these arguments is organised straightforwardly into four further sections. 
The next section explains how political science and cultural economy have focused elsewhere so that 
there is little discussion about the effects of what in Boden and Epstein’s (2006) terminology we 
could call ‘policy-based evidence machines’. Section 3 describes how economic interests format 
discourse by considering the standard form of trade narrative; this lists social benefits to create a 
halo effect around private interests which works through selection and de-contextualisation. This is 
illustrated with case material drawn from privatised railways, pharmaceuticals, finance and defence 
in the United States and United Kingdom. The fourth section considers political framing and shows 
how trade narratives are an important, but not necessarily robust, means of intra-elite alignment 
through an echo effect as political elites are enlisted to repeat trade claims and policy supports 
private interests. The final section offers a conclusion which considers the implications for public 
debate. 
 
2. Literatures with other objects 
Quite remarkably, there is no substantial, extant literature on trade narrative. The task of this review 
section is to explain why this is so because political science and cultural economy have been 
preoccupied with other objects like lobbying and performativity and have therefore focused on 
other kinds of power and influence (including elite power) which work in ways very different from 
trade narrative. As we argue in our review, the focus on the power of lobbying and performativity is 
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not wrong but ill-suited for this instance simply because it consigns trades narrative to the edges of 
the field of the visible. There is a useful discussion of issues cognate to trade narrative in the 
literatures on policy evaluation and on business story telling. But, as we will argue, these literatures 
leave us with no clear model for thinking about the nature and efficacy of trade narrative, which is 
the concern in subsequent sections of this article.      
The analysis of lobbying in political science can be traced back to Finer’s (1958) seminal work. But 
the current preoccupation owes much to the way in which lobbying was foregrounded a generation 
ago from the right by liberal economists like Kreuger (1974) and Stigler (1971), who believed that 
lobbying interferes with markets. From a very different centre left point of view, the power of 
business lobbying was highlighted in the 2000s by radical and social democratic political scientists 
including Crouch (2004) and Moran (2003) who were trying to understand the polity that has 
replaced the Keynesian welfare state. While some pluralist political scientists appear relaxed about 
it, there is widespread suspicion about lobbying. This has been fed by a popular, progressive 
literature on corporate lobbying which frames the activity as a subversion of the formal democratic 
process because lobbyists can buy influence over decisions from a corruptible political system (e.g. 
Lessig, 2011; Cave and Rowell, 2014; Palast, 2004).  
Much of the post-1970s liberal critique of lobbying derives from two seminal articles by former 
World Bank chief economist, Anne Krueger (1974) and by Chicago economist George Stigler (1971) 
who criticised ‘rent seeking’ and ‘regulatory capture’ by special interest groups which politically 
subvert efficient markets. Electoral disengagement meant that political representatives had wide 
discretion to introduce regulations which were not in the general interest (Stigler, 1971: 10-11) and 
business – or at least big business – was well incentivised and resourced to seek influence. Krueger 
(1974) argued that rent seeking could become a competitive activity as business elites will attempt – 
legally and illegally – to influence officials and elected politicians for special privileges and 
protections (Krueger, 1974: 292-3). Stigler’s separate but related work on regulatory capture argued 
that all business interests – from truckers to professional groups – will use state regulation to create 
and maintain enclaves of privilege: applying the principle of rational choice, he argued that ‘every 
industry or occupation that has enough political power to utilize the state will seek to control entry’ 
of competitors by means such as quotas, tariffs and price controls (1971: 4-6).  
Politically, these concepts of rent seeking and regulatory capture contributed to the ascendancy of 
public choice economics within policymaking circles. They eroded the ‘idealistic view’ of state 
regulation in the public interest (Stigler, 1971:17) and propelled subsequent efforts to roll back what 
Krueger termed ‘the proliferation of economic controls’ in the post-war period (Krueger, 1974: 293). 
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Intellectually, these concepts framed much subsequent academic work on how sectoral business 
interests seek political influence in high income countries. They have been employed extensively, 
and convincingly, in studies of how the financial sector used lobbying to obtain ‘light touch’ 
regulation prior to the 2008 global financial crisis and generous bailouts afterwards  (e.g. Blau et al., 
2013;  Young, 2012; Igan et al., 2009).  Much of what happened before and after the global financial 
crisis can be fitted into a framework of regulatory capture.  
More recently, from a quite different point of view, the preoccupation with lobby power has been 
reinforced by radical and social democratic political scientists concerned to understand the changes 
of governance and government which have paradoxically granted business much more political 
influence since the liberal turn in Britain and America. In a history of the British polity, Moran (2003: 
4-5) argues that ‘club government’ has been replaced by ‘hyper innovation’ and a new kind of 
‘regulatory state’ which takes on more than it can manage in areas like rail regulation and food 
safety. By implication, governance then becomes increasingly dependent on business advice and 
consent. Crouch develops a different argument about post-democracy and the retreat of the 
Keynesian welfare state in Western high income countries. After the atrophy of mass parties and the 
decline of the organised working class, elections become a ‘spectacle’ (Crouch, 2004: 4) and ‘politics 
is really shaped in private by interactions between elected governments and elites that 
overwhelmingly represent business interests’ (Crouch, 2004: 4). A professional political class is 
‘linked to the rest of society more or less solely via business lobbyists (Crouch, 2004: viii) and the key 
institution is ‘the global firm’ which can lobby on its own behalf without requiring trade associations.  
Across this disparate body of work, the preoccupation is with lobbying as a privileged form of 
business power. Lobbying is generally understood as insider persuasion behind closed doors and 
about specialist technical issues; and this is very different from the public communication about 
broad social benefits which concern us in this article. This point emerges clearly from political 
science reference works and scholarly studies. The Oxford Handbook of British Politics (Flinders et 
al., 2009: 1-2) defines lobbying as attempting to modify public policy ‘in specialist policy debates’; 
lobbying is part of a complex ‘insider politics process’ which seeks the consent of affected parties 
and which grants access and influence in return for political support and policy advice’. This is the 
definition of business power which is operationalised in studies of lobbying at different political 
levels. Thus, the standard scholarly account of EU lobbying by Coen and Richardson (2009) focuses 
on the influence of 2,600 special interest groups which have Brussels offices. The focus is on their 
influence over legislation in the pre-drafting stage which has contributed to the emergence of ‘a 
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European level policy making elite’ especially on technical standard setting and regulatory issues like 
light bulb efficiency or car emissions (Coen and Richardson, 2009: 347).  
Lobbying over technicalities does matter: for example, concessions to industry lobbyists have 
allowed diesel vehicle emissions which are the major contributor to the pollution of outdoor city air 
that, according to official calculations, causes more than 40,000 premature deaths in the UK every 
year (Royal College of Physicians, 2016: 3). But the focus on lobbying in political science encourages 
narrow ways of thinking about influence in terms of the intentionality of corporate actors; in doing 
so it neglects more recent concern with how knowledges format the world and possibilities of action 
which is represented in the newer cultural economy literature on the performativity of economics. If 
we are considering trade narrative, this cultural economy literature appears relevant because trade 
narrative is produced by specialist consultants and much of it uses economic categories. But, the 
issue here is that cultural economy since Callon has tended to represent (economic) expertise as an 
active and evolving theoretical framework always ready to constitute new economic orders or 
market arrangements; in this respect, cultural economy shares key active knowledge assumptions 
with the earlier literature on governmentality. The problem is that, in trade narrative, expertise 
figures rather differently as the docile servant.   
Callon set a new agenda for study of the economy-discourse relation when he argued economics 
‘performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather than observing how it functions’ (1998:30), 
because economics enacts the reality it describes by influencing economic actors who are the 
ultimate object of economic theory (2006: 5). In the science and technology studies-influenced 
literature on finance by authors like Mackenzie (2004), Mackenzie & Millo (2003), Callon (1998; 
2007) and Beunza and Garud (2007), the technical discourse of financial economics constitutes the 
economy (or at least particular markets within it), as the mathematical models and theories of the 
former shape behaviours among market participants who then perform the latter. The performative 
relationship between discourse and its object can ‘misfire’ (Callon, 2010) or become counter-
performative (Mackenzie, 2004), but the underlying basis for such research is a causal arrow running 
from discourse to the economy. An example of this approach is Beunza and Garud’s (2007) work on 
stock analysts following Amazon.com, which in their view, ultimately shaped markets by guiding the 
behaviour of market participants – the large portfolio managers who were the clients of the 
analysts.  
As Beunza and Garud argue, calculative frames were unstable: both subject to critique from rivals, 
and hostage to events which rendered them untenable (in this case, the dotcom crash). Callon uses 
the term agencement1 to describe the co-evolutionary relation between discourse and its object, 
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and the issue for economic theory is less its truth value but whether it can create a stable 
agencement (2006: 16). This arrangement of discourse and materialities is tied together and broken 
apart by events as elaborated in Mackenzie’s path-breaking work on derivative markets, which 
argued that the theory itself changes the object to which it refers (Mackenzie, 2004: 306). During its 
widespread adoption from the mid-1970s to 1987, the Black-Scholes option pricing equation created 
the worldly conditions for its own verification (Mackenzie and Millo, 2003). However, the formula 
also encouraged behaviours which eventually undermined the conditions of its verisimilitude, a 
process Mackenzie calls ‘counter-performativity’ as the adoption of the theory weakens ‘the 
preconditions of its own empirical validity’ (Mackenzie, 2004: 306). This is continued by Mackenzie’s 
subsequent work on the post-2007 financial crash, where causal significance is attached to cross-
default assumptions on mortgage securities which had been carried over from corporate bonds 
(Mackenzie, 2008b).  
In a second category, the earlier, Foucauldian-inspired literature exemplified by, for example, Miller 
(1990, 2001; Miller & O’Leary, 1987), Mitchell (1998, 1991) and Ferguson (1990), pays more overt 
attention to the operation of political interests in the discursive formatting of economic life. 
However, this literature also describes a causal process in which predominantly expert discourses – 
in these instances, management accountants and development planners – bring their objects into 
being. Miller and O’Leary (1987), for example, take the accounting innovation of standard costing 
and budgeting in the early 20th Century as a ‘calculative technology’ which facilitated increased 
management supervision, subjecting the workforce to ‘a continual process of judgement’ (Miller and 
O’Leary, 1987: 242). Expert discourse in fields like accountancy or state planning, argued Miller and 
Rose (1990: 7), is not simply a conveyor of meaning but an ‘intellectual technology’ which 
constitutes political objects. Moreover, Mitchell’s (2002) work on economic development 
interventions in Egypt raises broader issues about how the idea of ‘the economy’ as a politically 
manageable, autonomous realm in social life relates to the mid-20th Century advent of macro-
economic modelling techniques and aggregated national economic statistics (1998: 89-91). Mitchell 
captures the political outcomes of economic expertise which include the unintended and perverse as 
in the opening chapter of his Rule of Experts. But again the founding assumption is that the causal 
arrow runs from discourse to the economy, because none of the elements and relationships 
described within the economy pre-exist representation (Mitchell, 1998: 92).  
Matters are altogether more complicated if we consider cultural economy analyses of non-expert, 
multi-author discourses on the economy, which present a messier world of circularity and infelicity 
where there are no clear arrows and more hucksters than experts. The relevant work here includes 
studies of unstable narrative framings and the story telling of giant firms under pressure for 
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shareholder value (Froud et al., 2006) or studies of the formation of stock market bubbles through 
processes of ‘rhetorical fabrication’ (Thrift, 2001; 1997). Here we have discussion of issues cognate 
to sectoral trade narrative but conducted on the assumption that everything proceeds smoothly 
until numbers which are beyond the story teller’s control undermine the plausibility of the narrative. 
Again, this does not engage with trade narrative where, as we will argue, the arithmetic is such that 
the numbers are always positive and corroborating.  
Since the advent of shareholder value, individual public companies have had to produce stories for 
investors and try to enlist analysts and journalists as co-authors. Froud et al. argue the result is a 
giant firm ‘narrative of strategic purpose’, combining both words and symbolic actions with a 
performative intent (2006: 122-33). However, the plausibility of the narrative depends on supportive 
financial numbers when management has limited capacity to manage the financial numbers; these 
represent the ‘obdurate externals’ to the narrative (Froud et al., 2006: 100). If the financial numbers 
corroborate the narrative of management purpose and capacity, as in GE under Jack Welch, the 
markets and media suspend disbelief. When, more usually, the firm is struggling to produce the 
financial numbers, as in Ford under Jac Nasser, the results are messy and often include the 
departure of the storytelling CEO.  
There is a similar emphasis on storytelling and its limits in the work of cultural economy authors like 
Thrift (2001) on how a phenomenon like the new economy is talked into existence, or Frank’s 
analysis of the rise of ‘market populism’ (2002: xiv). Neither is centred on sheltered coteries of 
experts. Thrift’s ‘cultural circuit of capital’ is about ‘the link-up of a series of institutions to produce 
and disseminate business knowledge’ and it comprises business school academics, finance gurus and 
management consultants (Thrift, 2005: 95) who provided the ‘rhetorical push’ for the dotcom boom 
(Thrift, 2001: 414-16). In parallel, governments and corporate executives not only talked-up but 
embodied the ‘new economy’ through policies and management strategies, creating ‘a taken-for-
granted world which… assumes the new economy’s assumptions’ (Thrift, 2001: 418). But all this only 
talks up the value of dotcom stocks before the inevitable crash because prices are hugely ahead of 
earnings.  Here again, the numbers are the obdurate, uncontrollable externals which change so that 
they make the taken for granted unbelievable. 
For all its emphasis on the formatting of the world, many different kinds of cultural economy 
recognise the intrusion of awkward events and contradictory evidence as a kind of limit on 
fabrication. Interestingly, a rather different position is taken by some authors in the policy 
evaluation literature where evidence is manipulable and empirics do not get in the way of a good 
story. Boden and Epstein’s (2006: 226) argument about the government machine was that the 
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routines of ‘evidence based policy making’ delivered little social benefit but benefited the political 
classes as ‘government, in its broadest sense, seeks to capture the knowledge producing processes 
to the point where this type of ‘research’ might best be described as ‘policy based evidence’. Their 
pejorative description most obviously fits the agenda-managing efforts of government departments 
like health and education in the UK when faced with the task of justifying a succession of ill-
conceived and poorly executed initiatives and reorganisations like commissioning in the health 
service. But it does raise interesting questions about whether the policy-based evidence machine is 
much larger and includes trade associations and consultancies that feed government and the media 
in ways that benefit private interests; and, if so, how does it manage the empirical dimension of 
narrative and with what effects? 
 
3. Trade narrative and the halo effect   
If trade narrative is a neglected object, it is quite another thing to argue that this is an important 
adjunct to the power of business in present day capitalism. To make that larger point, this section 
considers how trade narrative is produced to create a kind of halo effect whereby all the private 
firms operating in a sector like pharmaceuticals or finance make a measured and positive social 
contribution to the public good; the subsequent section considers the effects of trade narrative 
which can interpellate elite political subjects and thereby establishes a fallible power. Our starting 
point is that some (but not all) trade associations commission narratives about how the sector serves 
the public interest. These are produced by enlisting consultants whose calculation takes a standard 
arithmetical form because it adds up the positives (and only positives) to produce large aggregate 
totals of social benefits like exports, jobs and such like; sometimes supplemented with economic 
modelling of benefits. We would add that criticism is met with restatement of the numbers, not 
reflection on the limits of the benefits calculation so that this knowledge is politically edifying rather 
than intellectually interesting.  
All trade associations provide direct membership services of one sort or another as recompense for 
the membership subscription which individual firms pay. Such membership services can include 
insurance, collective promotion through trade fairs or advertising campaigns, as well as issue-by-
issue lobbying on regulations relevant to the trade. And these services are the sole activity of many 
or most trade associations like the UK-based National Federation of Roofing Contractors or the 
Carpet Foundation. But, in Davis’ Bourdieusian terminology, some trade associations also have a 
different kind of promotional role as intermediaries engaged in the exertion of ‘discursive and 
symbolic influence’ for economic interests (2013: 9). These trade associations which engage in this 
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supplementary promotional activity typically operate in sectors which are exposed to political 
pressure because profit opportunities depend on a contestable regulatory regime or state subsidy. 
Examples of such associations include, for example, in the UK the Association of Train Operating 
Companies (ATOC) and the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI), which must 
respectively defend the privilege of state subsidy for privatised rail operators and the regime of 
intellectual property rights which grants the patents that shield shields drug companies. In the 
United States, examples include the Center for Capital Market Competitiveness (CCMC) and Financial 
Services Roundtable (FSR), which have resisted pressures for far-reaching re- regulation in the wake 
of the 2008 financial crisis; or the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), whose narrative 
defends the contractors who benefit from state military spending.  
Some of these trade associations are under immediate pressure from social critics, others are more 
comfortably placed. But the immediately interesting point is that the trade narrative typically down 
plays explicitly partisan political argument in favour of piling up empirics about broad social 
contribution. Especially in the United States, some trade associations use free enterprise rhetoric: 
thus, the Center for Capital Market Competitiveness (2015) combats the reformist pressures in the 
wake of the financial crisis with ‘ten truths about the financial system’ which include the claim that 
‘overregulation stifles innovation’. But, altogether more typical is the arms industry’s National 
Defense Industrial Association (2015) approach of highlighting ‘[t]he contribution that the aerospace 
and defense (A&D) sector makes to American economic success’. Trade narrative thus aims to be an 
indirect form of persuasion: the decisive consideration is the empirical size of the contribution not 
the inherent virtue of private enterprise and free markets; this focus is useful because many of the 
firms in sectors under pressure do not operate in competitive markets, instead enjoying the benefits 
of various kinds of monopoly. 
The work of measuring social contribution is typically done by outside consultants. This is partly a 
matter of practicality. Trade associations usually have a limited in house research capacity when 
their own staff economists only monitor sales, exports and such like; they generally lack the 
expertise for technical exercises like economic modelling. Hence trade narratives either draw on, or 
are jointly authored with, consultancy firms of various kinds. In the UK, the major consultancies 
producing trade narrative include Oxford Economics, McKinsey & Company, and the Boston 
Consulting Group as well as the consulting arms of the big accountancy firms like KPMG and PWC. 
Firms like KPMG have worked on trade narrative for many different sectors and thus have an 
organisational knowledge of what is required and can easily provide a variant product to the next 
sector that comes along. In this context, trade narrative could be considered a routine or practice.    
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The relation between trade association and research consultancy is ambiguous in much the same 
way as in the case of the relation between the public company and its auditor; the consultancy is 
both a hired hand who delivers what the client wants and an independent source of authority for 
the veracity of the numbers. The consultants offer expertise as docile calculators at the service of 
business needs on an hourly rate. Thus, Oxera’s website promises knowledge and technique at the 
service of the client: ‘benefit from our deep sector knowledge, combined with our unrivalled 
economics skills, tailored to your business need’. But consultancy names and logos also feature 
prominently in the trade’s reports and glossy pamphlets because the explicit crediting of research to 
external experts buttresses the authority of claims which could otherwise be dismissed as special 
pleading. The Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) 2013 report about ‘how franchising 
helped transform railways into a success story’ presented ‘original research’ based on ‘data collated 
and analysed by KPMG’. 
Across many different sectors, trade narrative then takes a generic form because social 
‘contribution’ and ‘value’ is demonstrated by attaching big numbers to a list of good things which 
are attributed to private action. The question is usually the same and is often in the title of the 
report; the answer is a list of big numbers which dominate the executive summary. Thus, Oxera 
(2014) for the Rail Delivery Group asks ‘What is the contribution of rail to the UK economy’; the 
Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (2014) reports on ‘Delivering value to the UK: the 
contribution of the pharma industry to patients, the NHS and the economy’; and the British Banking 
Association (2014) on ‘The benefits of banking’, outlines how, although the sector ‘made mistakes in 
the last decade’, through taxes ‘[banks] contribute billions of pounds a year to our public services, 
paying the salaries of nurses, teachers and other vital workers’. The Association of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) (2014) has an eye-catching opening page graphic which gives ‘our 
value in numbers’. Six big figures emphasise the technology base and the trade contribution, with 
£11.5m invested in the UK per day on research and development, a trade surplus of £3bn, and 
responsibility for one eighth of the ‘world’s most popular prescription medicines’ (ABPI, 2014). In the 
same way, pushing at the spending limitations imposed by the 2011 Budget Control Act the National 
Defense Industrial Association suggests the defence industry contributes 5% of US manufacturing 
output and makes the ‘highest net positive contribution to this country’s trade balance of any 
economic sector’ (National Defense and Industrial Association, 2015: 1). 
This contribution is occasionally calculated by economic modelling. Thus, the Rail Delivery Group 
commissioned Oxera consulting to provide ‘an independent assessment of the contribution of the 
GB rail industry to the UK economy’ (Oxera, 2014). Oxera did so by economic modelling which 
produced the bottom line claim that, since privatisation, the ‘change in industry model … may have 
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provided benefits of up to £7.2 billion in 2013’. More usually, the calculation is arithmetical and the 
method is adding up numbers which have a positive value. The categories must be varied sector by 
sector because research expenditure is a relevant activity specific measure in pharma but not train 
operating. But there is also much emphasis on what might be called generic aggregates like exports 
and jobs which can be treated as indisputably good things. The end result is a list of big numbers 
often summed up as financial values quoted in millions of pounds and/ or benchmarked against 
national income. There are sometimes half-hearted attempts to translate such abstractions into 
specifics which could figure in popular political debate, as when the British Bankers Association 
claims that its members contribute enough in tax revenue to pay 1,130,725 nurses (BBA, 2014).  
This accentuation of the positive is reinforced by a causal trope: private initiative is relentlessly 
identified as the cause of all the good things summed in the big numbers. The case for the status quo 
has to be aggressive in a sector like rail. Here there is cause for public concern when direct and 
indirect state subsidy rose in the 2000s to levels higher than during public ownership (Bowman et 
al., 2013a) and franchisees have walked away when faced with insufficient profits (McCartney & 
Stittle, 2011). In the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) 2013 report, the strategy is 
not to mention such embarrassments but foreground successes which are all attributed to rail 
franchising. 
The franchising model has enabled train companies to generate significant financial returns for 
the Government, played a crucial role in delivering unprecedented growth in journey numbers, 
and provided passengers with improved services and better value (ATOC, 2013: 29; emphasis 
added). 
If trade narratives are taken at face value, in each sector they create a kind of halo effect around 
private firms. For the message of trade narrative is always the same: the pursuit of private profit 
under the present regulatory and contractual regime produces a large stream of social benefits 
which have been carefully added up by independent researchers. The sometimes explicit conclusion 
is that, as in the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry’s argument, the sector is a 
national ‘asset’ which should be ‘nurtured’ by appropriate regulation (ABPI, 2014: 2). It is ironic that 
some of this uses the techniques of economics; or more commonly invokes the prestige of 
economics, even though such presentations can be read as highly political. The intellectual problem 
is that trade narrative rests on multiple decisions which always have the effect of flattering the 
contribution of the firms within a sector. The flattering effect is produced by three devices routinely 
used by consultants to produce the list of big number benefits: first, an arithmetic which adds 
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benefits without subtracting related costs; second, de-contextualization which accentuates the 
positive; third, assertion of doubtful causal connections without qualification or hesitation.  
Addition without subtraction. Academic economists disagree about how to measure costs and 
benefits; they also debate whether established techniques of cost benefit analysis are relevant to 
large projects with long-run consequences (Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2004). But most would agree 
that costs as well as benefits should be included in any social calculus of business impact. In trade 
narrative, the consultants instead produce benefits-and-no-costs analysis, which is inadequate in all 
sectors and positively egregious in finance, where the socialisation of losses has imposed huge social 
costs. Engelen et al. (2011) discussed the inadequacy of the trade narrative around the benefits of 
finance before and after the great financial crisis which led to recession after 2008. Strikingly, six 
years after the 2008 crisis, the consultancy firm Oxford Economics (2013: 2-3) is still providing 
annual updates on the ‘contribution’ of London financial services to gross value added (net output). 
These calculations do not recognise that, for example, because of a finance-induced recession, 
overall national output in the UK is substantially lower than would have been expected from the 
long term trend before financial crisis; or acknowledge that a variety of widely cited studies by 
Haldane (2010) and others provide widely accepted measures of that output loss.       
Decontextualization to accentuate the positive.  For example, in the pharmaceutical industry’s trade 
narrative the key decontextualized factoid is spending on research and development. This is 
decontextualized because big pharma companies have frequently spent more money on marketing 
than research and development. And furthermore, despite endless reorganisation, most research 
and development does not produce fundamental innovation but imitative drugs; while big pharma 
also avoids developing products in therapeutic areas, like antibiotics, where there are limited 
prospects of recovering development costs (Froud et al., 2006: 149-223). While this kind of 
supplementary information could be read in many ways, it is clearly the case that any overview 
should include the overall composition of costs and would also consider marketing and research and 
development expenditures side by side because high expenditure on both is the defining 
characteristic of the traditional blockbuster pharmaceutical business model. Marketing spend does 
not figure at all in the pharma trade narrative simply because it would complicate the story.   
Assertion of doubtful causal connection. The consultants engaged by the rail industry attribute the 
increase in passenger numbers to the marketing and pricing policies of the private train operators; 
but many other researchers (and the train operating companies themselves) recognise the 
importance of GDP growth and fluctuation as the key driver. If yield management by train operators 
did boost passenger numbers that also produced discontent about cheap fares for advanced tickets 
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at inconvenient times (Bowman et al., 2013a: 121-7). Furthermore, pricing and marketing are 
unlikely to be the sole or main driver of passenger numbers because gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth, employment patterns and inner city house prices are all likely to exert a large influence over 
passenger numbers. Most of this is entirely outside the control of the operators. The train operating 
companies privately conceded that GDP drives passenger numbers when they successfully lobbied 
government for franchise contract terms; this is because their subsidy was linked to GDP growth 
(Bowman et al., 2013b: 10). 
McCloskey (1985) argued that economics discourse is partly rhetorical in ways which involve 
unjustified assumptions and leaps in argument towards assertion. But trade narrative carries this to 
an extreme. There is no one correct answer to the question of how to represent complex sectors of 
the economy, but all the intellectually interesting mess is conjured away in trade narrative. Thus, 
trade narrative works by turning each sector into a different Potemkin village presenting an 
agreeable prospect of social achievements produced by the private sector. It is however pointless to 
lament the intellectual deficiencies of trade narrative calculation and attribution, when the key 
questions are about political effects.  
  
4. Political justification and the echo effect 
This section turns to analyse the political effects of trade narrative, arguing that it works through an 
echo effect as the political classes (elected and official) and regulators often repeat facts, assertions 
and assumptions culled from trade narrative as the ready-made public interest justification for 
decisions and regulatory stance. If we set this in the context of financialisation, trade narrative has a 
new and important role in intra-elite communication because it connects and aligns corporate 
business and finance with senior politicians, civil servants and regulators; these are the decision 
makers in centralised and hierarchical national political systems but they are beyond direct business 
control and formally responsible for serving the public interest. The caveat is that trade narrative 
probably has very little influence on ordinary citizens; so, the operation of the elite relay depends on 
a post-democratic disengagement which is threatened by any kind of insurgent populism. 
Giant corporations and financial elites face a recurrent problem about how to manage sovereign 
political power. This has been addressed via different mechanisms and institutions in various forms 
of industrial and financial capitalism, which also transform the field of elite action. The connection 
between finance and business elites was in many ways strengthened by financialisation. Financial 
deregulation after the late 1980s in the UK and USA gave finance a leading role and opened new 
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opportunities for organised money in the form of fund investment to press its distinctive priorities 
on corporate business: managers of stock market listed companies were directly subject to 
shareholder value demands, while private equity spread the arbitrage of limited liability and other 
practices of controlling subsidiaries so as to maximise returns for the parent (Erturk et al., 2008: 1-
43). But, the connection of business and finance with political elites was weakened because 
employers’ associations lost a political role in the UK and USA with the end of the formal and 
informal corporatism that had co-opted business organisations and elite business leaders into 
political processes (Mizruchi, 2013).  
If financialisation gave business and financial elites a much larger sphere of action in the UK and 
USA, the end of high level political conversation that was a feature of corporatism also created new 
problems for business about how to manage government, which operates ostensibly around notions 
of the public interest and social good. And this problem had to be solved because structural reform 
in countries like the UK and USA had become a politically-sponsored attempt at market creation 
which did not remove the state from whole sectors, but rather reconfigured its role. This new state 
role included setting regulatory frameworks which engineer the market especially in the privatised 
utilities with natural monopoly; and subsequently, justifying various forms of outsourcing. The new 
role included the provision of various forms of direct or indirect subsidy in sectors of foundational 
importance; hence, in the UK and other high income countries we have financial support for 
infrastructure or deposit guarantees for the banks to safeguard provision of welfare-critical goods 
and services. In this context, the sectoral trade association gains a new role as storyteller to 
government and wider society, with trade narrative supplying a high-minded public justification of 
subsidies and protection through claims of social contribution. This work cannot easily be done by a 
multi-sector employers’ organisation because the post-1979 assault on the social settlement in the 
name of competition is like house breaking; sectors must be tackled one at a time, and corporate 
interests must subsequently be defended sector by sector. As Mizruchi (2013) argues, big business 
may have lost a broad view of the social interest; we would add that in politically exposed sectors it 
can still hire consultants to make a sectoral argument about social contribution.  
The first index of successful trade narrative is therefore an echo effect, when the speeches of senior 
politicians and regulators repeat trade claims about sectoral achievement and social contribution. As 
British transport ministers routinely do in relation to the rail sector (see, for example, Department 
for Transport, 2013). Politicians of the centre-right and centre-left benefit because a listing of the 
social benefits delivered usefully rebuts the charge that public policy serves private interests; 
regulators benefit because it removes the suspicion they have been captured. The echo benefits the 
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sector because it makes undoing existing institutional and regulatory regimes more unthinkable and 
encourages policy changes which are conciliatory rather than challenging. The most notorious 
example of this kind of echo effect can be found in the relation between the finance sector and key 
government and regulatory figures in the US and UK pre-crisis years. Central bankers and leading 
politicians across the major advanced economies adopted the trade narrative of the major banks 
about the benefits of light touch regulation amid claims that financial innovation spread risk and a 
larger financial sector contributed to national prosperity (Engelen et al., 2011: 132-46).  
Most important among these figures was Alan Greenspan. As chair of the Federal Reserve, he 
pushed for the 1999 repeal of the post-depression Glass Steagall Act and subsequently took up the 
cause of assuaging concerns about the increasing size and complexity of the financial sector. In 2003, 
for example, Greenspan lauded the success of the burgeoning trade in over-the-counter derivatives, 
which ‘could not have been achieved were it not for counterparties’ substantial freedom from 
regulatory constraints’ (Greenspan, 2003). These complex new derivatives, so heavily implicated in 
the subsequent crash of 2008, were said to be ‘underpinning the enhanced resilience of our largest 
financial intermediaries’ by unbundling and redistributing risk (Greenspan, 2003). Two years later, 
Greenspan noted how credit derivatives had ‘contributed to the stability of the banking system’, 
while mounting concerns about the expansion of the shadow banking system were unfounded 
because ‘unregulated and less heavily regulated entities generally are subject to more-effective 
market discipline than banks’ (Greenspan, 2005). In May 2007, just before the onset of the crisis, 
Greenspan’s successor, Ben Bernanke, took exactly the same line.  
The increasing sophistication and depth of financial markets promote economic growth by 
allocating capital where it can be most productive. And the dispersion of risk more broadly 
across the financial system has, thus far, increased the resilience of the system and the 
economy to shocks (Bernanke, 2007). 
With minor variations, these claims and assertions by central bankers were reported in media 
articles and incorporated in political speeches on both sides of the Atlantic. Gordon Brown’s 2006 
and 2007 Mansion House speeches are notorious for the way in which a finance minister read back 
the finance sector’s pre-crisis trade narrative factoids to an audience of the bankers who had paid to 
have them produced.  As with the trade association reports, Brown starts with the big numbers on 
contribution to the UK by noting in 2007 that ‘40 per cent of the world's foreign equities are traded 
here, more than New York’ (Brown, 2007), and claiming in 2006 that ‘[f]inancial services are now 7 
per cent of our economy… A larger share of our economy than they are in any other major economy’ 
(Brown, 2006). The speeches laud the ‘remarkable achievements’ of ‘an era that history will record 
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as the beginning of a new golden age for the City of London’ (Brown, 2007). Such repetition of claims 
and assertions promoted a redefinition of the UK financial sector which was represented less as a 
humble service industry and more as a national engine of growth in its own right, with a legitimate 
claim for special legislative treatment (Davis, 2013: 180-8) because ‘the City’ was a national asset 
which needed nurturing. Brown’s speeches end predictably with lists of finance-friendly legislation 
introduced or in the pipeline. Thus in 2007 the priority is ‘maintaining a competitive tax regime’ with 
the lowest corporation tax in the G8 (Brown, 2007); while in 2006 the commitment is to continuing 
tight fiscal and monetary policy, and ‘a predictable and light touch regulatory environment’, 
confirmed by the rejection of any Sarbanes-Oxley style tightening of company law (Brown, 2006). 
Such efforts continued post-crisis but with limited modifications of established trade narrative to 
take account of events. When the assertions about the benefits of financial innovation were 
discredited by events post-2008, finance in the UK fought a rear-guard action by reiterating claims 
about social contribution. If the finance sector was still socially valuable as a job creator and 
taxpayer, it was implied that policy makers should not pursue the objective of shrinking the financial 
sector and restraining its operations. 
The first UK restatement of this social contribution came in the 2009 Bischoff report (HM Treasury, 
2009) where the claims about contribution were jointly signed-off by a senior banker and the then 
Labour Chancellor, Alastair Darling. In the UK, this positive social contribution argument has since 
been pushed by new cheerleaders for finance like Boris Johnson when Mayor of London; and the 
social value of finance narrative has subsequently been explicitly endorsed by Bank of England 
Governor, Mark Carney (Bank of England, 2013). In the UK, regulators and senior office holding 
politicians are all now publicly orthodox in an echo effect way about finance’s social achievements. 
In the United States, where regulatory reform has been considerably more ambitious, groups such as 
the Financial Services Roundtable, representative of the 100 largest financial services companies, 
have responded more fiercely by criticising the ‘aggressive posture’ of state agencies; such actions 
are deemed undesirable because they reduce consumer choice and limits access to finance for low 
income citizens (Financial Services Roundtable, 2014). 
The outcome in UK finance shows how trade narratives about social contribution can be restated 
with modest revisions, even after massive crisis. Occasionally, as in the global pharmaceutical 
industry in the late 1990s or UK finance after 2008, trade narratives are damaged by devastating 
criticism or discrediting events which are accessible and intelligible to the public. In pharmaceuticals, 
the trade narrative was shredded by NGOs like Médicins Sans Frontières and Oxfam in late 1990s 
campaigning on the issue of the high costs of anti-retroviral medication to treat HIV-AIDS. The 
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problems in finance involved damaging events including costly bail-outs of the banking system after 
2008, which produced outrage amongst the many who did not understand credit default swaps but 
could see that finance had privatised gains and was now socialising its losses. The trade’s response 
to criticism is invariably conservative: as in the Bischof report, the supporting statistics are updated 
and the old narrative is restated with limited variation, on the basis or hope that the echo effect can 
be re-established.  
The effects of trade narrative on citizen opinion are unclear but the presumption is that the political 
effects on the opinions of ordinary citizens are weak and may often be negligible. It is not difficult for 
trade associations to place stories, especially in the quality press and broadcast media whose 
business coverage is much less sceptical and adversarial than their political coverage. Sector 
specialist journalists are dependent on the trade for continuing access to stories ahead of rivals and, 
more generally, business pages are filled by the ‘churnalism’ of copying out press releases. According 
to an UK content analysis by Lewis et al. (2008: 10), 41% of press articles and 52% of broadcast news 
items in 2006 relied on press releases in an agenda-setting role or as the basis for most of the article. 
But the effects on newspapers readers and citizens is much more uncertain. Trade narratives add 
claims about social contribution which circulate in a field of blooming, buzzing confusion about 
business and ‘the economy’. Most UK citizens have a limited understanding of basic economic 
concepts and measures: for example, in a YouGov opinion poll, 60% of UK respondents could not 
choose the correct definition of GDP from a short list (Inman, 2015). They are much less likely to 
remember or weight claims about pharmaceutical industry research expenditures or passenger 
numbers on the railways.   
Trade narratives do not appear to suppress citizen hostility, especially to sectors whose profits 
depend on public subsidy. This hostility is encouraged by media scapegoating of business villains like 
the ‘scumbag millionaires’ in finance; and it is sustained by the enduring appeal of back-to-the-
future policy ideas, like rail renationalisation which, according to polls, is consistently supported by a 
majority of the UK population (YouGov, 2013). But such manifest public hostility in the UK has had 
limited political effects. The decline of mass parties and traditional forms of political participation in 
many high income countries, as charted by political scientists like Mair (2013) and Crouch (2004), 
has resulted in a post-democratic disengagement between the electorate and the professional 
political classes of centre-left and centre-right which reinforces their unresponsiveness to public 
opinion. However, this could easily change if insurgent populism threatens their political franchises. 
 
5. The public debate of alternatives?   
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Our understanding of the diverse forms of elite power changes with each new capitalist conjuncture 
and as new knowledges shift the field of the visible. The argument of this article has been that 
existing knowledges have largely ignored trade narrative which serves as an important relay of intra-
elite communication between business and financial elites and the senior politicians and elected 
officials who can use a public interest justification for giving business what it wants in contestable 
sectors like pharmaceuticals and finance. This is a contribution to elite studies which, as Mills 
argued, should include ‘the framings and practices through which elite power is exercised’.  
Such framing was an important part of classical mid-twentieth century elite studies. When Wright 
Mills tried to explain how the United States had committed to the Cold War without democratic 
discussion or consent, he opposed Dahlian pluralism by invoking elite power which he credited with 
the power to abolish resistance through ‘authority’ and ‘manipulation’. The elite exercised power 
from ‘the command posts of modern society’ (Mills, 1956: 27) in the business, political and military 
bureaucracy; while the media produced the discursive formatting that abolished electoral choices. 
Indeed, Mills’ claimed that ‘the structural clue to the power elite today… is the decline of politics as 
genuine and public debate of alternative decisions’ (Mills, 1956: 274). His explanation of this process 
was of its time: for Mills, mid-century America was a ‘mass society’ where individuals received 
‘propaganda’ from ‘centralized points of control’ in the media (Mills, 1956: 304-5).  
This kind of Millsian explanation is obsolete in financialised capitalism, which has fewer command 
posts and more diverse elites; and it is also, quite rightly, epistemologically and ontologically 
unacceptable to present-day social scientists. But the question about the framings and practices 
through which elite power is exercised remains important even if the outcome is now much less 
assured. Through halo and echo effects, trade narratives may be important in intra-elite 
communication between financial, business and political groups but they are almost certainly much 
less effective in any kind of top down framing of electoral choice. With the rise of populism of the 
left and right in many high income countries, and after the Brexit vote in the UK, the question must 
be whether and how, in the next conjuncture, comfortable intra-elite understandings of what is 
thinkable and doable are disrupted by popular discontents. In thinking about that interference we 
will need to go forwards using all the resources of cultural economy; as Gond et al. (2015) have 
argued, Callon proposes one of five available concepts of performativity and maybe, as with post-
democracy, we will need to draw on other concepts. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1 A material and linguistic becoming, the evolving fit between discourse and its object, which is commonly - but 
problematically - translated to ‘assemblage’ in English language literature (Phillips, 2006)  
